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Abstract 
The law on sedition in India has been employed as a tool 
of harassment to curb free speech. This has resulted in 
widespread demands to repeal the provisions regarding 
sedition as it is seen as an archaic law that was meant to 
serve the colonial interests.  In this paper, the researcher 
explores the law on sedition under section 124A of the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860. The researcher seeks to propose 
an amendment to section 124A, by devising Austin‟s 
Speech Acts Theory, Sorial‟s exposition based on Austin‟s 
theory and by accommodating the prevalent judicial 
interpretation into the existing provision. 
Keywords: Free Speech, Judicial Interpretation, Section 124A, 
Sedition, Speech Acts Theory. 
Introduction 
“Guess what‟s common between a high profile tribal rights 
activist,1 a renowned Indian author,2 a talented cartoonist3 and a 
                                                          
 Third Year, B.A. LL.B.(Hons.), National Academy of Legal Studies and 
Research, Hyderabad;  narayanan.aishwarya94@gmail.com 
1 C. Sathyamala, Binayak Sen: Refining Health Care in an Unjust Society, 4(3) 
INDIAN J. MED. ETH. 104, 104-105 (2007), (Dr.Binayak Sen, the General 
Secretary of P.U.C.L., was arrested in May 2007 for allegedly acting as a 
courier for a jailed Maoist leader in Chhattisgarh). 
2 Press Trust of India, Sedition Case Registered Against Arundhati Roy, 
Geelani, NDTV, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.ndtv.com/ article/ india/ 
sedition-case-registered-against-arundhati-roy-geelani-69431, 
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group of Kashmiri students cheering for Pakistan in a cricket 
match?”4 All of them have been innocent victims of the supposedly 
„draconian‟ law on sedition in India. The manner in which the law 
relating to sedition has been misused of late has brought it sharply 
into the limelight for all the wrong reasons. The provisions that 
deal with sedition have been subject to rampant scrutiny and 
public criticism, with some advocating a complete repeal of the 
same. In this light, it becomes important to carefully study the law 
relating to sedition and examine its pros and cons before jumping 
to arbitrary conclusions. In this paper, an attempt is undertaken to 
make an informed study of the law of sedition and suggest a way 
forward on the basis of the information collected.   
The paper has been divided into four parts. The first part is a 
general introduction to the law of sedition in India, the relevant 
provision and its scope. The second part deals with the case against 
sedition and presents arguments which are commonly cited against 
the law of sedition. It also examines the manner in which the same 
has been interpreted in a restricted sense by the judiciary. The third 
part draws upon Austin‟s Speech Acts Theory to determine the 
nature of seditious harm and argues how the very nature of the act 
makes it one befitting the status of an offence rather than 
reiterating the conventional arguments for sedition. The last part 
includes the conclusion and suggestions. On the basis of the 
arguments presented, it offers a modified version of the sedition 
                                                                                                                                    
(Arundhati Roy and Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani were 
arrested for allegedly making anti-India speeches at a conference on 
“Azadi – the Only Way” in 2010). 
3 Special Correspondent, Mumbai Police Arrest Cartoonist, Slap Sedition, 
Cybercrime Charges On Him, THE HINDU, Sept. 10, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/mumbai-police-arrest-
cartoonist-slap-sedition-cybercrime-charges-on-him/article3877809.ece, 
(Aseem Trivedi was arrested for making and publishing seditious 
cartoons as part of the India against Corruption movement in 2012). 
4 Dean Nelson, Indian Kashmiri Cricket Fans to be Charged for Cheering 
Pakistan, Mar. 25, 2014, THE TELEGRAPH, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/10678163/I
ndian-Kashmiri-cricket-fans-to-be-charged-for-cheering-Pakistan.html, 
(A group of Kashmiri students was arrested in Meerut for cheering for 
Pakistan in a televised Asia Cup cricket match in May 2014).  
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law thereby striking a fine balance between the proponents and 
opponents of the same.  
Law on Sedition in India 
Law relating to sedition in India is correctly viewed as a relic of the 
British rule, a constant reminder of that inglorious period of our 
past. It has been aptly quoted that, “the sedition provisions are a 
prime example of the manner in which the imperial powers of a 
foreign government are transformed into the normal powers of an 
independent regime.”5 The law against sedition is primarily 
contained in section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). It is 
important to note that the word „sedition‟ has not been used 
anywhere in the Constitution; it merely forms a marginal note to 
the section in the IPC.6 It was also removed as one of the grounds 
for nullification of laws under Article 13(2) of the Constitution.7 
Macaulay‟s Draft Penal Code contained the offence of sedition in 
Section 113; however, the same was dropped from the final version 
adopted in 1860.8  Section 124A was subsequently inserted in 1870 
when the British government felt the need for a specific provision 
to deal with the offence in light of the increasing „Wahabi‟ revolts.9 
The provision as it stands today finds its place in Chapter VI of the 
IPC which deals with „Offences against the State.‟10 
                                                          
5 Siddharth Narrain, ‘Disaffection’ and the Law: The Chilling Effect of Sedition 
Laws in India, 46(8) ECON. POLIT. WKLY 33, 33-37 (Feb. 19, 2011), available 
at http://jmi.ac.in/upload/menuupload/16_ccmg_epwsedition.pdf. 
6 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 534 (Justice Y.V. 
Chardrachud & V.R. Manohar eds., 31st ed. 2006). 
7 Id.  
8 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSIVE POLICY, 
NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY, & ALTERNATIVE LAW FORUM, 
SEDITION LAWS & THE DEATH OF FREE SPEECH IN INDIA 9 (Chandan 
Gowda ed, 1st ed. 2011), available at 
https://www.nls.ac.in/resources/csseip/Files/SeditionLaws_cover_Fi
nal.pdf. 
9 Narrain, supra note 5 at 33.   
10 (It is interesting to note that the provision relating to sedition has been 
placed in Chapter VI rather than Chapter VIII of the IPC which deals 
with Offences against Public Tranquillity. This clearly indicates that the 
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The Section and its Scope 
As already mentioned, section 124A of the IPC11 is the primary 
source of sedition law in India. On a plain reading of the section, 
one can identify the following four elements that are required for it 
to be invoked: 
I. A person must bring, or attempt to bring into hatred or 
contempt, or excite or attempt to excite disaffection; 
II. Such disaffection should be targeted against the 
government established by law in India; 
III. The said disaffection may be caused by words (written or 
spoken), or by signs, or by visible representation, or 
otherwise; and 
IV. The said words must not amount to a fair criticism of policy 
or administrative action undertaken by the government 
(which are protected by the explanations to the section). 
It is apparent that the section has been couched in the broadest 
possible language so as to accord it with a wide ranging scope. 
Sedition is an intention driven offence. While actual disturbance is 
not necessary to be proved to establish an offence under section 
124A, it is necessary to prove that the impugned words were 
uttered with the intention of inciting hatred; a mere tendency to 
incite hatred would not suffice.12 Such intention must be gauged by 
the standards of a reasonable man.13 This section has historically 
been employed against prominent leaders of the national 
movement like Balgangadhar Tilak, Mahatma Gandhi and Annie 
Besant.14 However, as shall be subsequently discussed, the courts 
have increasingly moved away from a draconian interpretation of 
the law and construed this Section in narrow terms to try and 
                                                                                                                                    
section is intended to criminalize mere words regardless of any 
consequent action. Disturbance to public order is implicitly not intended 
to be included as a necessary ingredient of the section. However, this 
view has been altered by the Supreme Court as discussed later). 
11 PEN. CODE § 124 A.  
12 RATANLAL, supra note 6 at 356.   
13 Id at 356. 
14 ALTERNATIVE LAW FORUM, BANGALORE, supra note 8 at 10-14. 
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prevent the misuse of excessively arbitrary and discretionary 
power by the authorities.  
THE CASE AGAINST SEDITION 
“Section 124A, under which I am happily charged is perhaps the 
prince among the political sections of the Indian Penal Code 
designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen”.15 
Mahatma Gandhi, March 18, 1922 
The aforementioned quote succinctly reduces the entire argument 
against sedition into a single line. The case against sedition is one 
that has been argued on multiple prongs. Most of the arguments 
against sedition which are based on freedom of speech, superiority 
of the state, ineffective implementation etc have been reiterated 
time and again and therefore the researcher does not intend to deal 
them in detail. However, a detailed discussion on the provision 
regarding sedition as interpreted by the Supreme Court is 
undertaken, thereby reflecting the judicial hesitance in employing 
the section.   
The Free Speech Argument 
The most often cited argument against sedition finds its basis in the 
principle of free speech. The Constitution of India guarantees the 
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).16  The 
constitutionality of section124A has often been challenged in court 
on the ground that the said provision is violative of the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression and is therefore ultra 
vires the Constitution. However, the matter has emphatically been 
settled by the Supreme Court in 1962 where it held that section 
124A was not unconstitutional, subject to certain limitations which 
shall be discussed later.17 However, the opponents of the law 
                                                          
15 Id at 14 (Mahatma Gandhi, during his famous sedition trial of 1922). 
16 (What is often ignored is the fact that the right is not absolute and is 
subject to the limitations contained in Article 19(2) which allows the 
State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech in 
certain situations). 
17 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 S.C.R. Supl. (2) 769.  
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relating to sedition continue to use the free speech argument as the 
foundation of their dissent on the sedition law.  
The free speech argument is closely linked with India‟s democratic 
set up. It is argued that India being a democracy, the right to air 
one‟s views and opinions about the Government is not just 
desirable, but is necessary for its proper functioning.18  Active 
public participation forms the backbone of a functional democracy 
and any curtailment of this right of participation is necessarily 
frowned upon. It can further be argued that a provision for sedition 
which necessarily places the government at a higher pedestal than 
the citizens has no place in a democracy where the people 
themselves are the true rulers, or at least have the power to choose 
their own rulers.  
The Judicial View on Sedition 
Since its establishment in 1950, the Supreme Court of India has 
only dealt with thirty eight cases that refer to sedition and has 
pronounced only six judgements wherein it has extensively 
discussed the offence.19 This naturally leads to two inferences: (1) 
the offence of sedition is not one that has been misused to the 
extent to which it is hyped; and (2) even when the courts have dealt 
with the issue of sedition, they have done so in a rather narrow and 
restricted manner. A very brief overview of the approach adopted 
by the Supreme Court in dealing with this issue is given below. 
The courts in the pre independence era had interpreted sedition to 
give the term „disaffection‟ a very wide connotation while holding 
that for the offence of sedition to be committed, the amount of 
disaffection and the causing of actual disturbance were 
                                                          
18 ALTERNATIVE LAW FORUM, supra note 8 at 15-18 (Similar views were 
expressed by the framers of the Constitution in the Constituent 
Assembly). 
19 Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M., Monghyr & Ors. (1970) 3 S.C.C. 746; Balwant 
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 S.C.C. 214; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State 
of A.P., (1997) 7 S.C.C. 431, Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 
S.C.R. Supl. (2) 769, Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 
124, Brij Bhushan & Anr v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 129. 
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immaterial20. In the first case on sedition that was decided by the 
Supreme Court, Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras21, section 124A of 
the IPC was declared unconstitutional since it falls outside the 
scope of Article 19(2).22 
In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,23 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of section 124A, while at the same time 
curtailing its meaning and limiting its application to acts that 
clearly involved a tendency to create public disorder. Such a 
restricted understanding of the term has been upheld and adopted 
in the subsequent decisions also.24 The Court has gone as far as to 
state that, “the objects of sedition generally are to induce discontent 
and insurrection, and stir up opposition to the Government, and 
bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the very 
tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and 
rebellion.”25 
The approach of the court has indicated its reluctance to accord a 
wide magnitude to the offence of sedition and has instead 
restricted it to the narrowest margin possible. However, the recent 
arrests of Aseem Trivedi, certain Kashmiri students and several 
others, display a glaring disconnection between the established 
position of the law and its actual implementation.26 The discord 
between the higher judiciary, the lower judiciary and the police has 
resulted in a state of affairs that makes a mockery of the law as it 
presently stands.   
                                                          
20 ALTERNATIVE LAW FORUM, supra note 8 at 12 (Sedition Trial of Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak in 1908). 
21 Romesh Thapar, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124. 
22 (It must be noted that at this time Article 19(2) included only „security of 
state‟ and not „public order‟ as a ground to justify restriction of speech. 
In order to rectify this, the First Amendment to the Constitution was 
enacted in 1951 to include „public order‟ as one of the grounds for 
restricting the freedom of speech under Article 19(2)). 
23 Kedar Nath Singh, 1962 S.C.R. Supl. (2) 769.  
24 Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M., Monghyr & Ors. (1970) 3 S.C.C. 746; Balwant 
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 S.C.C. 214; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State 
of A.P., (1997) 7 S.C.C. 431. 
25 Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 S.C.C. 461. 
26 ALTERNATIVE LAW FORUM, supra note 8 at 29. 
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THE CASE FOR SEDITION 
“Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by 
mankind”.27 
Rudyard Kipling, London, 1923 
There is perhaps no better way to argue the case for sedition than 
to quote the above words. While making a case against sedition, the 
researcher highlighted some of the common arguments that are 
presented by the opponents of the law relating to sedition and also 
looked into the judicial history of the same in India. The researcher, 
in this paper refrains from following a similar approach to make a 
case for sedition and providing counter arguments to the points 
raised. This is because the arguments regarding imposition of 
reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech, the 
constitutionality of the law on sedition and the natural superiority 
of the State on the basis of the Social Contract Theory28 have 
already been the subject of widespread discussion. Therefore, the 
researcher intends to address the issues through another approach.  
In this regard, the paper focuses on the nature of seditious harm 
and the inherently dangerous nature of words themselves rather 
than the concept of rights and principles. The author employs J.L. 
Austin‟s Speech Acts Theory29 to contend that certain types of 
words are dangerous in themselves and are therefore liable to be 
punished without considering their consequences. The research 
also extensively draws upon the works of Sarah Sorial30 to discuss 
the nature of seditious harm. In order to fully comprehend the 
                                                          
27 Rudyard Kipling, Surgeons and the Soul inA WORD OF BOOKS available at 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kipling/rudyard/words/chapter23.
html (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).   
28 (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau each propounded a different version of 
the Social Contract Theory; however, in each case the essence of the 
theory is the formation of a State which would be superior to the citizens 
– irrespective of whether it is in the form of a leviathan, a representative 
government or sovereign). 
29 J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (Harvard University 
Press, 1st ed., 1962).  
30 Sarah Sorial, Can Saying Something Make it So? The Nature of Seditious 
Harm 29 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 273-305 (2010).  
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arguments raised in this paper, it is necessary to briefly review 
Austin‟s Speech Acts Theory and Sorial‟s argument. 
Austin’s Speech Acts Theory 
J.L. Austin was a twentieth century British philosopher of language 
who is credited to be the developer of the Theory of Speech Acts.  
His book, „How to do Things with Words‟ (1962) is considered to be 
the origin of the Speech Acts Theory. Prior to Austin, linguistic 
philosophers had directed their attention exclusively to linguistic 
acts that had truth value (i.e., statements, declarations etc.). This 
centred around the division between proper names and functional 
expressions developed by Gottlob Frege. However, problems 
raised by attempts at classifying sentences into either category 
resulted in the development of the notion of truth value. Thus, 
every sentence, whether in the form of a declaration, or in the form 
of predicate expressions used to denote classes of objects, is used to 
denote some specified object in the form of its truth value i.e., the 
true or the false. Thus, the statement „Bangalore is a city‟ is 
necessarily true while „Mount Everest is a city‟ is necessarily false. 
Every statement therefore has an inherent truth value.31   
Austin‟s Theory emerged from a rejection of both the 
meaningful/meaningless divide (depending upon whether the 
utterance in itself has any meaning) and the 
constative/performative divide (between statements that are 
merely statements and those that constitute acts) prevalent in the 
linguistic theory. Instead, Austin proposed that all statements have 
both a constative as well as a performative aspect. Therefore, each 
statement is a statement like a declaration and is also intended to 
perform a particular act.  
The basic theme underlying the theory is that not only do 
statements describe things or state facts; they also perform a certain 
kind of action by themselves. He defined „speech acts‟ as those 
units of speech that have both a performative and a constative 
                                                          
31Truth Values, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-values/#1 (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015).  
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dimension.32Austin further proposed three categories of speech 
acts; locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The speech acts 
of making a meaningful utterance by vocalizing the sentence is a 
locutionary act. A locutionary act consists of three components. It 
involves the production of some sounds or noises (phonetic act).  
These noises are intentionally produced as belonging to a certain 
language and following certain grammar (phatic act). This 
utterance which has been intentionally produced in a certain order 
conveys certain messages (rhetic act). Performing all the three 
together constitutes a locutionary act.33 
An illocutionary act is one wherein the speaker actually performs 
an act in uttering the sentence. Every statement must be taken in a 
certain way, i.e., it has got an illocutionary force and uttering such a 
statement is an illocutionary act. For example, by uttering the 
words „I apologize‟, the speaker intends to perform the act of 
apologizing and the phrase itself must be taken as an apology.34 
A perlocutionary act is one wherein the speaker tries to accomplish 
an act by uttering it. The speaker tries to produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts and actions of the 
audience. Therein, he performs a perlocutionary act.35 Persuading, 
convincing or getting people to do something are examples of 
perlocutionary acts. All three categories are often involved in the 
same speech act. What category a particular speech acts falls under 
depends upon the perspective from which the act is viewed.36 
Austin further presented five general classes of illocutionary forces: 
verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and 
expositives.37 Verdictives are related to the act of pronouncing a 
judgement or a verdict, most commonly associated with juries or 
                                                          
32Kevin Halion, Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory: A Defence of the 
Distinction between Normal and Parasitic Speech Acts, E-ANGLAIS, available 
at http://www.e-anglais.com/thesis.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).    
33 Id. 
34 Halion, supra note 32. 
35 Halion, supra note 32. 
36 Halion, supra note 32. 
37Yoshitake Masaki, Critique of J.L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory: 
Decentralization of the Speaker-Centred Meaning in Communication, 2 
KYUSHU COMMUNICATION STUDIES 30, 27-43 (2004). 
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judges. Exercitives are related to executions of right or authority. 
Statements ordering action fall under this type. Commissives are 
those by which the speaker is obliged to do something by uttering a 
statement. A promise is a typical example of this type. Behabitives 
are related to attitudes or social behaviour. The act of 
congratulating falls under this type. Expositives are mostly 
clarificatory in nature, explaining to the listener how a particular 
statement fits the conversation or the situation. Words like 
„describe‟ and „explain‟ are typically used in this context.38 
Moreover, performatory devices are a special kind of illocutionary 
devices,39 i.e., they are the kind of words which when spoken 
constitute the act itself. For example, the utterance of the words „I 
do‟ by the bride and the groom during a wedding ceremony 
constitutes the very act of getting married. The statement is not 
merely descriptive or normative but performative in nature. 
Performatives are merely a type of illocutionary acts which were 
initially used to connote statements that were explicitly acts. Thus, 
„I promise to be there at 5‟ would be performative in the sense of 
making a promise while „I will be there at 5‟ would not. Later 
developments resulted in the classification of performatives as 
explicit and implicit, thus brining both the above sentences within 
the ambit of performatives. Performatives in this sense are just a 
category or subtype of illocutionary acts.   
Austin‟s Speech Acts Theory has come under considerable scrutiny 
and criticism. The theory has been modified by Searle to replace 
locutionary acts with propositional acts which are basically 
incorporated within illocutionary acts.40 In this sense, Searle further 
strengthens the Speech Acts Theory by accepting and further 
proposing that in fact all statements do constitute acts of some sort.  
Cohen challenged Austin‟s Theory by questioning the very 
existence of illocutionary forces. He claimed that statements by 
themselves have some meaning and it is this meaning that gives 
them force. There is no need to have force as a separate component 
as it is intrinsically derived from the meaning of the words 
                                                          
38 Id at 30.  
39 Halion, supra note 32.   
40 Id. 
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themselves.41 Even this argument does little to pose a substantive 
challenge to the proposition that words have a performative aspect 
and can constitute acts. It merely questions the source of the force 
which grants words with the status of acts. This source is irrelevant 
to the determination of whether the statement in fact constitutes an 
act, and to that extent, Austin‟s Theory stands unchallenged. His 
Speech Acts Theory marked a turning point in modern day 
linguistics by shifting the focus of language philosophers from the 
truth value of statements to the performative value of words.   
The Nature of Seditious Harm 
Sorial uses Austin‟s Speech Acts Theory to demonstrate that certain 
words are inherently dangerous and their very utterance may give 
rise to harm. She assumes that some words do constitute acts in 
themselves. She analyzes the concept of illocutionary acts and 
concludes that, for illocutionary acts to have the desired effect, they 
must be uttered with the intention to do the said act,42 and that the 
words must be spoken by the appropriate person in the 
appropriate context.43 These two criteria namely speaker and intent 
lend the words their illocutionary force.  She further notes that 
verdictive and exercitive acts have the additional qualities of being 
„obligation enacting‟44 and enacting the „permissibility conditions‟ 
necessary for inflicting violence.45 The very nature of these acts as 
giving judgements or commands poses a sense of obligation upon 
the listener and urges him to perform the desired act.  
Sorial makes these observations in the context of speeches by 
authoritative religious leaders and clerics that incite violence. In 
such cases, she argues that the speech itself constitutes the act as it 
exhibits the aforementioned qualities. She further contends that 
                                                          
41 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Speech Acts, (Jul. 03, 2007) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-acts/. 
42 R. Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS 305, 293-330 (1993). 
43 Sorial, supra note 30 at 290. 
44 Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, The Limits of Free Speech: 
Pornography and the Question of Coverage, 13(1) LEGAL THEORY 45, 41-68 
(2007). 
45 Id.  
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such types of speech acts; verdictive and exercitive speech acts that 
enact the permissibility conditions for violence by altering norms and 
imposing obligations should not be protected by a free speech 
principle irrespective of whether any actual violence occurs.46  She, 
thus, advocates that, in cases relating to religious incitement of 
violence, the speech itself should be punishable, provided that it is 
uttered by a person in authority and is understood in context.47 
The Need to Punish Sedition 
The author argues in natural continuation of Sorial‟s argument by 
extending it to other persons in authority who may exercise 
considerable political and/or public influence. The author bases 
her argument on the premise that it is important to retain sedition 
as a crime against the State, for the State is the protector of our 
rights and there can be no substantive rights in the absence of the 
State. Therefore, destabilizing the State by any means is 
undesirable and liable to be punished.  
According to the author, certain words when spoken by certain 
persons in particular contexts, do have the authority to incite 
violence. This is not restricted to merely religious leaders but 
equally extends to persons who exercise political influence or 
command the respect of the public in general. Therefore, a call by a 
well known Naxal leader (either popular or notorious depending 
upon which side of the battle one supports) instigating a revolution 
and calling for an overthrowing of the government or by a well 
known state leader demanding secession from the country is as 
seditious as a fatwa calling for violence.  
The speakers, by virtue of their authority, have the power to 
influence people, to instigate them to commit mutiny and cause 
disorder. In such cases, the very utterance of the words constitutes 
the act of incitement and thereby amounts to the crime of sedition. 
These acts fall within the category of exercitive acts that enact the 
permissibility conditions for causing violence. Not only do these 
words by themselves constitute the act of incitement, they more 
often than not also have the desired effect of causing incitement. 
                                                          
46 Sorial, supra note 30 at 298.   
47 Sorial, supra note 30 at 276.  
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Thus, the ability of words to cause such effects by their very 
utterance exposes their intrinsically dangerous character.  
The author further contends that such cases fall beyond the 
protection of free speech not just because of the nature of the words 
and their tendency to cause violence, but because in such 
situations, the words themselves constitute the acts and therefore 
fall outside the purview of the free speech doctrine. The free speech 
doctrine, as the very name suggests, protects speech and not acts. 
Speech that amounts to acts is not afforded this protection.   
The author finally rests her case upon the inherently dangerous 
nature of words that lends them susceptible to punishment 
provided that certain essential prerequisites are fulfilled. The 
inferences and conclusions drawn on this basis shall be enumerated 
in the next and final part of the paper.  
Conclusion: The Way Forward 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that there is 
a real and pressing need to strike an appropriate balance between 
the views of the proponents and opponents of the law relating to 
sedition. While the case against sedition has its merits, it is not 
enough to overwhelm and overrule the case for sedition. In such a 
situation, the author seeks to propose a middle ground as the way 
forward; a solution that factors in both the sociological as well as 
the precedential aspects of the law of sedition. The author is of the 
view that it is important to retain sedition as an offence but not in 
its present form.  
In light of this, the following modification to the law is suggested. 
Section 124A should be retained subject to three conditions: first, 
that, the offender must be in a position of authority (as suggested 
by Sorial); second, that, the offending words must be understood in 
context (as suggested by Sorial); and, third, they should have a 
tendency to actually cause violence or disorder (as held in Kedar 
Nath Singh).  
Thus, the redrafted section 124A would read as follows:  
124A. Sedition -- Whoever by words, either spoken 
or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, 
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or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred 
or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite 
disaffection towards, the Government established by 
law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for life, to which fine may be added, or with 
imprisonment which may extend to three years, to 
which fine may be added, or with fine.  
Provided that the offender must be in a position of 
authority and influence;  
Provided further that the offending words or signs 
or representations must be understood in the 
relevant context in which they are expressed; and  
Provided further that the said expressions must 
have a tendency to actually cause violence or public 
disorder.  
Explanation 1 – The expression „disaffection‟ 
includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.  
Explanation 2 – Comments expressing  
disapprobation of the measures of the Government 
with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful 
means, without exciting or attempting to excite 
hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute 
an offence under this Section.  
Explanation 3 – Comments expressing 
disapprobation of the administrative or other action 
of the Government without exciting or attempting to 
excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not 
constitute an offence under this Section. 
While it is important to retain the provisions relating to sedition, it 
must also be subject to certain statutory safeguards. The researcher 
opines that such redrafting would provide the most efficient 
solution to the problem caused by the misuse of sedition law. It is 
expected that the section in the proposed form would adequately 
serve this purpose.   
 
